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Abstract
We discuss a simple model of disk backups and other maintenance processes that include change to computer data. We determine
optimal strategies for scheduling such processes. A maximum entropy model of random change provides a simple and intuitive
guide to the process of sector based disk change and leads to an easily computable optimum time for backup that is robust to
changes in the model. We conclude with some theoretical considerations about strategies for organizing backup information.
c© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Change is a characteristic of computer systems as they interact with users by keyboard or by network access.
Some changes are desirable, while others are considered to be contrary to policy and must be repaired through
maintenance. In this paper, we consider the problem of formulating optimal and desirable policies for maintaining
systems undergoing change. We are particularly interested in the common, yet understudied problem of disk backups.
While backup schedules and technologies have been discussed a lot—see Refs. [1–20], to our knowledge no one
has tried to formulate a theory of risk management using backup as a maintenance process explicitly, though see [21]
for related ideas. The closest one comes is perhaps the fault tree analysis in Ref. [22].
System policy refers to the decisions and schedules that govern the configuration and running of a human–computer
system. Policy is generally implemented in terms of rules for behavior and procedures for maintenance. It applies both
to humans and to computers. Clearly, policy should be based on a sound model of system behavior [23] if it is to lead
to a successful decision-making. Policy success entails both the efficiency and security of the system.
In this paper, we shall consider only the aspects of policy that are programmable into a computer. This means, we
effectively identify policy with rules for correctness of system state. We can then think of change in terms of a simple
linear response model.
Suppose we imagine, heuristically, that the set of all data is given by Q, and that the subset of data that are
redundantly stored as an up-to-date version, according to policy, is P . We can define the maintenance set δQ in terms
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of deviation from policy:
δQ(t) = Q(t)− P(t). (1)
Thus, when a system obeys backup policy the need for maintenance (backup) δQ is zero. The important point here
is that the relationship between P and Q changes as a function of time, because changes are being made to the data
in real time.
2. Disk backups
Disk backups are an important area for system policy. They involve deciding when to schedule the archiving of
data, in order to protect against accidental or catastrophic loss. Most system administrators have a routine for this that
is based on minimizing their perception of load on the system rather than on minimizing the risk of data loss.
For example, system administrators often take backups during the night, when they believe the system is least
active. However, this practice is motivated more by folklore than by science, nor is it necessarily possible to find such
a time in a globalized network age, where systems are active twenty-four hours per day, seven days per week. A more
scientific approach is called for.
In this paper we would like to ask a specific question: when should a backup be made in order to minimize the risk
of loss? Risk can be defined in many ways. Here we shall take a look at some traditional and pragmatic approaches to
defining the meaning of risk. In statistics, risk is defined as expected loss, thus for this application we get the following
definition:
Definition 1 (Maintenance Risk). A numerical value proportional to the expected loss of objects in the maintenance
set for a given policy.
The total risk is usually the maintenance risk plus the expected cost of implementing the policy:
Rtotal = Rmaintenance + Cpolicy. (2)
In Eq. (2) we see two terms. One is the maintenance risk and the other is the cost of the policy. The cost of the
policy can stem from different factors, but the most important one will be the number of backups done. If we are only
interested in finding out when we ought to do backup, but have already established how often to do so, the cost term
will be irrelevant. If we want to determine the number of backups (and possibly the form of backup to be used), this
term is crucial. We will take a short look at this term in a later section.
Accidents and catastrophes can happen unpredictably at any time. We shall assume that their arrival is a flat,
homogeneous process. Changes to data also occur with a predictable pattern and the number of changes increases
with time. Thus the longer the time elapsed without updating changes to data, the greater the chance of loss by
accident or catastrophe. We can use this simple idea to define the idea of risk as a generalization of the familiar notion
of Mean Time To Repair [24,25], namely a numerical value proportional to the expectation value of the Time To
Repair, calculated over all objects in the maintenance set. Later on, we will take a look at such a risk function. Note
that the form of the risk function in Eq. (2) is more general than this and can describe models where maintenance risk
is not proportional to the expectation value of the Time To Repair, as will be seen in Section 6. Section 7 will however
use this idea.
Why can we not simply keep perfectly up-to-date copies? Ideally, one can imagine a situation in which an original
and backup were perfectly synchronized, by always copying every change to multiple copies (copy on write). This
technology exists but it is not always practical or affordable from a resource point of view. The maintenance risk might
be minimal, but the cost of such a policy might be great. Thus the total risk can not be expected to be minimal for
such a policy.
We shall not argue about the reasons for use or non-use of mirroring. Rather we consider the effect of system
behavior on decisions about a fixed regimen of batch-copying. This is the traditional understanding of a backup
procedure in system administration.
3. Backup and random processes
As was described in the previous section, risk is described as expected loss. Since there might be factors that are out
of our control, such as user behavior and system failures, we can not describe future events with certainty. Instead, we
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need to introduce such factors as random processes and the different relevant features of the future state might be seen
as stochastic variables. Losses in the future will be a function of the system state, and will thus also be a stochastic
variable. Our best guess at what the loss will be is its expectation value.
An expectation value can be viewed as that value, which the mean of measurements of a stochastic variable
approaches, when the number of measurement increases to infinity. When the variable takes only finite values, the
expectation is the weighted sum of the different outcomes weighted by the probability of the outcomes, thus we write
EX =∑mi=1 xiPr (X = xi )when the stochastic variable can take m different values, with the set of possible outcomes
being {xi }. When the outcomes are continuous, the sum becomes an integral and the probability becomes a probability
density.
A real-world sample will always be of finite size, and will thus not be exactly equal to the expectation value.
However, the mean value will be an unbiased estimate of that expectation. Thus when we do not know the expectation
value, a sample mean can be a good guess on what to expect. For instance, if we want to know the expected user
activity at Fridays, we might compute the mean activity on Fridays for the sample we have.
The maintenance theorem [23,26] was introduced as a way of describing the level of outstanding maintenance in
a system, given a schedule for repair. In this paper we investigate the meaning of the maintenance theorem for risk
management specifically in relation to disk backups. We will also take a look at some competing risk functions. One
of the problems one faces here is in obtaining appropriate data to measure the changes taking place.
To quantify a model for backup, we should address a number of competing processes in the problem:
• Rates of user activity (leading to changes on disk).
• Rates of change or event arrivals on the disk subsystem (clustered or independent arrivals).
• Rate of change detection (often scheduled intervals).
• Rate of repair (e.g. capacity of the backup communication channel).
Since the first of these is more easy to measure than the latter; one can hope that the first two of these will be correlated.
A maintenance process, such as a backup, can be thought of as a queue [27,28] in which change ‘arrivals’ are
processed and dispatched by a renewal process. In traditional queuing theory, arrival events are often assumed to
follow the pattern of a Poisson arrival process, i.e. as a stream of random, independent arrivals. This assumption
is made because it is simple and has special analytical properties. Poisson arrival models cope well with truly
independent events; however, it is known from observation that many computer arrival processes are not Poisson
processes, for a variety of reasons. Arrivals of events are often clustered, or come in ‘bursts’, exhibiting power law
frequency distributions. Other data are inhomogeneous Poisson processes, i.e. they have time-varying means, and even
time-varying variances. The only way to determine the correct type of model is to observe actual systems and collect
data, at each new site.
3.1. User activity process
The arrival times of events at a computer system are the direct results of service requests or the execution of
programs by users and can be measured. Such data reveal the patterns of system usage that lead to changes. It is
natural to expect that the frequency of data changes would be correlated with user activity.
We refer here specifically to measurements made in Ref. [29], in which arrival data from a number of international
sources were examined.
The most basic observation we can make about user behavior is that it follows a basic daily rhythm [29]. For
example, data from the measurements of user activity at Oslo University College, shown in Fig. 1, we see a distinct
maximum in user processes around midday and a lull at around 5:00 or 6:00 in the morning. In addition there is a
weekly rhythm that typically peaks around Tuesday and lulls on Saturday. While the details of this profile will change
from site to site, its essence is the same.
Clearly user behavior must be correlated somehow with changes to disk files (see Fig. 2), since there is a direct
causation involved. The only exception could be scheduled batch jobs, which add a constant signal. Even processes
that are driven by remote users, through network services, are mediated by processes running on the local host. A
knowledge of the patterns of user activity is thus necessary.
The data in Figs. 1 and 2 show that the arrival process is basically inhomogeneous: it exhibits a periodic trend.
Before delving further into the subject, a few definitions might be in order:
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Fig. 1. The weekly average of hostname database lookups from Windows computers. The peaks occur at about midday of each weekday.
Fig. 2. A heuristic comparison between arrivals at a given time of week and the corresponding numbers of processes on the same host. These graphs
exhibit the same general pattern. Correlations can be used to identify the probable dominant cause of the arrival process.
• Q(t) is the random process of arrivals as a function of time. Since future events of this type are unknown, we
will treat this as a stochastic variable. Ideally, this process should give the number of files updated at a completely
specific time (where one nanosecond is treated differently as another). So, in order for a time integral to yield
the number of files updated, this variable needs to be the number of files updated at time t times a delta function
centered at t . In order to treat this in a practical manner, we may think of this variable as the number of files
updated in a small interval, such as using a time resolution of one second. Thus Q(t) can been thought of as the
actual number of files updated on a given second starting at t and ending at t + 1 s.
• N (t0, t1) =
∫ t1
t0
Q(t)dt is the actual accumulated change in the time interval [t0, t1]. For the actual data, this will
thus be a set of stepwise increments.
• η(t1, t0) = EN (t1, t0) is the expected accumulated change in the same interval.
• q(t) = EQ(t) is the expected number of arrivals, and can be estimated using a statistical model for the random
process q(t) or simply by doing a sample mean. In this section we will take a look at possible models for q(t).
Note that since we usually do not have a fixed probability for an update at a given specific time, but rather for a
given time interval, the expectation of Q(t) will be modeled here as a continuous function.
When the starting time t0 is given, typically t0 = 0, we will simply write N (t) and η(t).
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Fig. 3. A sketch of the distribution of inter-arrival times for file changes. A log–log plot has a gradient of about 3/2, hence the power law in Eq. (4).
3.2. Inter-arrival times
The distribution of inter-arrival times describes the nature of the maintenance queue.
In a Poisson arrival process, the probability that the number of changes, which have arrived within time t , lies in
the class N (0, t) = n is:
P(N (0, t) = n) = (λt)
n
n! exp(−λt). (3)
In general, the inhomogeneous arrival rate λ(t) is a property of the locally steady-state process, though here we have
assumed a fixed rate, λ.
To test whether a Poisson process is suitable to characterize disk changes, we measured the distribution of 48,000
last-change events on disk file systems belonging to a well-used computer disk at Oslo University College. The inter-
arrival time distribution exhibited a highly clustered distribution of data, with an apparent long tail (see Fig. 3).
To check whether a parameterized Poisson model in fact could describe this, the 48,000 measured change events
were then modeled using a parameterized, inhomogeneous Poisson arrival process, modulated by hourly, daily, weekly
and monthly factors. This model was not successful, however. It showed huge deviations that could only indicate a
fundamental problem with the Poisson assumption.
The deviance of such a model measures the number of parameters required to model the arrival process, compared
to a fully saturated model, i.e. one that has as many parameters as there are measurements. We found that there
is essentially no reduction in the number of parameters needed, using a Poisson arrival assumption. This is clear
evidence that the Poisson model is fundamentally incorrect for disk change in general.
What about other models? Recently much attention has been given to so-called self-similar processes that exhibit
power law distributions [30,31], or generalized Le´vy processes [26,32]. Since most changes occur closely together,
within seconds, this short time part of the spectrum dominates by several orders of magnitude over the longer times.
However, there is also a non-zero probability of measuring inter-arrival times that are minutes and hours and even
days.
The 48,000 measurements showed a power law type frequency distribution of low order for the arrival process. An
approximate fit gives a distribution of the inter-arrival times on the following form:
fia(1t) = A 1t− 32 , (4)
where A is a constant amplitude. One could add an exponential term to make this normalizable, but we do not require
this here. We can note that many phenomena that are driven by social networks are described by power laws (see, for
instance, [33] for a discussion of this).
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What this distribution tells us is that, if any changes at all take place, they are likely to occur in rapid bursts, i.e.
‘any’ means ‘many’. Thus, in terms of risk, if one loses any data, one stands to lose a lot. Thus it becomes important
to minimize the time to backup.
We note, however, that relative time-scales are important here. Arrivals occur in millisecond bursts, while backups
are typically carried out over intervals of many hours. Seen in this light, the detailed type of arrival process becomes of
marginal relevance to the risk computation. The hourly inhomogeneity (trend) has dominant importance. Within each
inhomogeneous period the distribution of events is fairly even, on average and simple assumptions, like maximum
entropy models, are sufficient to approximate them.
3.3. Periodic change detection and updating
The maintenance theorem of Ref. [23] tells us that a regular maintenance of the system can lead to an average
stability if it is judiciously chosen. We therefore need to ascertain what the appropriate maintenance regimen should
be.
The magnitude of fluctuations in the arrival process is key to deciding what is possible here. How should we deal
with these changes? Several questions occur to us here:
1. When should a detector start scanning the file system for change, over the periodic (e.g. daily) cycle?
2. What is the risk associated with waiting once a change is made, or having a dead time between backup processes?
3. What is the cost associated with the backup process itself?
If one does not deal with changes immediately upon arrival, one has the problem of finding the changes again
amongst the rest of the data. In order to detect changes, without immediate notification by the file system, we need
a detection process, or some form of spatial disk scan. Like the temporal arrival process, this requires a model for
coordinatization of space (locations on a disk or file system) and time. The detection process scans through the system,
either using its hierarchical file structure, or using its disk block structure to detect change. There are two strategies
one might use here:
• Detect and update changes to disk blocks or sectors. Programs like dump or dd use this approach.
• Detect and update changes to entire files. A file might consist of many sectors, but for the purposes of backup, it is
regarded as a single entity. Programs like tar or cfengine use this approach.
The strategies for scheduling these traversals in time have two extremes:
• Backups parse file tree as quickly as possible (spans shortest possible time)
• Backups parse file tree slowly (spans a large interval of time, several runs do not overlap), i.e. as a “nice” process.
Finally, one must pick a time to start the scan.
In the first case above, the backup process presents the shortest interruption to system resource availability but with
high load (backup can be a disk and CPU intensive process that disrupts system performance for users). In the latter
case, one presents a low load to the system over a longer interval of time. The extreme case here would be to have a
continuous scan of the file tree, picking up modified files continuously and backup them up as a low priority process.
To decide between these two strategies one require a quantitative policy.
In the first case, one takes a rapid sharply focused snapshot of the file system. In the latter case, we take a blurred
snapshot capturing more changes over a longer time. It is not obvious which of these strategies can capture most
changes over a shortest ‘risk interval’. Clearly there is a choice to be made here: this choice must either be made as an
ad hoc policy decision, or by optimization of some criterion, e.g. by minimizing this risk of loss of data in the system.
We wish to explore the optimal solution.
4. How policy can reduce risk
Let us examine more closely the principle with which we might evaluate these strategies in terms of data capture
rates. If a backup is to succeed, then its performance must be such that its average capture rate is equal to the average
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Fig. 4. A simplified schematic plot of a daily data rate q(t) and cumulative change η(t) of data on a user disk. The straight dotted line shows the
rate of continuous detection and transfer required to backup data change as a continuous process. The dark blobs indicate short burst backups.
rate at which changes are made to the file system. The expected cumulative change to the file system at rate q(t), over





Note the regions of differing rates during on and off-peak times, m1 and m2, where m1 > m2. In region m1 there
is high risk of losing changes: there is m1/m2 times the risk in region m2. The likelihood of disruption by taking
backup, on the other hand is greater in region m1, so we might try to even out this disruption by capturing at a rate not
exceeding m2/m1 of the total rate of change. The simplest solution, when these are in balance, is thus when m1 = m2
and we have the constant rate of capture with dotted line, in Fig. 4.
Now, if we want to perform a quick non-disruptive backup, then this diagram tells us to perform the backup at the
positions marked by the dark blobs, since these lie at the end of the period of maximum change. By placing the backup
after the maximum rate period, we assume capture of the largest number of changes since the last backup, while at the
same time minimizing the disruption.
It is almost obvious from the diagram that, in this simplified picture, there is no advantage to choosing any special
time for a short burst daily backup except to minimize disruption. We do not capture any greater number of changes
in this way, on average. However, if we consider making more than one backup per day, or using a continuous scan
technique, there are advantages to picking the time more carefully and a more detailed analysis is required.
If we change any of these simplifying assumptions to make the model more realistic, some of the details will
change, but the essence will most likely remain somewhere between continuous transfer and short burst rates. Let us
now be more quantitative.
5. The general risk function
The risk function defines what we mean by an ‘optimal’ strategy. Thus, a certain care will have to be used when
we want to specify this function. The task is to translate rather vague and somewhat subjective wants and needs into
a mathematical function.
The risk is described by a function that computes the expected loss for each possible strategy. The strategy space
might have both discrete and continuous elements. In the context of doing backups, the strategy space over a given
time interval (say a month) is described by the number of backups done in this time interval and the time when
each backup should be done. There could be confounding factors found in the cost term in the risk function, such as
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deciding between full backup and backup of the last change. See Eqs. (2) and (8). Such complications will not be
investigated in later chapters, though such factors can be covered by the formalism in this section.
The risk function must necessarily have at least two components. The first component is the reason why one does
backups at all, namely the risk of losing valuable files. The expected loss of files for a given backup strategy will thus
be at the core of this component of the risk. The ‘loss of file’ part of the risk function does not need to depend linearly
on the expected number of files lost during a time interval. In fact any function that increases monotonically with the
expected loss of files is a candidate. However, we might take the ‘production’ and ‘loss’ of files as the ‘economy’ of
this system. In this case, we can set the ‘loss of file’ part of the risk function as linearly dependent on the expected
number of files lost for a given strategy, with the slope equal to unity.
In order to compare cost and maintenance risk on the same footing, we would need a common economy for
the expected loss. Since we in most applications are interested in the number of files lost, this might be the most
appropriate economy, and the cost of backup, originally given in money and work, would have to be translated to the
file economy using a proportionality constant.
The cost part of the risk function is needed in order to ‘punish’ backup strategies that run the backups too frequently.
The reason we need it is to avoid unreasonable solutions, and the reason why this is deemed so is that there is a cost
to doing backups. First of all, there is a starting cost in the hardware and competence needed to do backups. We will
assume that we are dealing with a system where the need for doing backups actually justifies this starting cost. Thus
we will ignore the starting cost. A constant term in the loss function will not modify the optimum of the risk function.
The cost of doing backups might be expected to increase with the number of backups done. There are several
reasons for this. First off, the more often one does backup the more hardware in the form of for instance tapes and
tape machines one needs. This cost comes in the form of money. Secondly, if one doubles the number of backups one
might also double the effort of the administrator(s) in running the backup system. Thus the administrator(s) will have
less time for other work. This results in a loss of productivity for the system administrator(s), both costing money and
loss of file production. Thirdly, running backups slows the system, making it harder for the users to produce the files
that one wants backup of. This comes in the form of loss of file production.
In introducing the first component of the risk function, we noted that it might be least difficult to use the loss of files
(or loss of file production) as the ‘economic’ penalty. Thus the monetary loss described here needs to be translated
into the worth of an average file. If one has an idea of how much each file in the system is worth (on average) one can
just invert this relation. If the produced files is worth nothing than obviously there would be no need to do backups.
Note that any given backup can jeopardize files arriving at the time of backup, as described in the previous section.
Whether this is seen as a price of the policy or as an independent file loss is a matter of taste, but in the following
form, we will take this into account as a separate factor and assume that the cost of a given policy can be specified
exactly.
Thus we can write (2) for a given time interval between backup done at time t0 and backup done at time t1:
Rpolicy(t0, t1) = Cpolicy(t0, t1)+ E(files lost in [t0, t1])+ E(files lost during backup at t1). (6)
Note that when t0 and t1 are fixed, there might not be much more of the policy to be specified. In later sections, this
will be assumed. Thus this equation is mainly interesting as a step toward a risk function for a given policy over time.
If we want to examine periodic backup routines such as daily backups, the cost function is irrelevant and we need
only concentrate on the last two terms. When the backup routine does not significantly raise the probability of loss,
the two terms can often be joined together, as seen in Section 7.
Ignoring the last term, or joining it with the middle term, one can take a closer look at Eq. (6) by dividing the
interval into single specific times:
Rpolicy(t0, t1) = Cpolicy(t0, t1)+
∫ t1
t0
E(Q(t)I (arrival at time t lost between t and t1))dt (7)
where I is the indicator function, defined as one if the statement is true and zero otherwise.
When one wants a backup policy for a general time interval, where more than one backup might be considered, the
general form becomes





E(Q(t)I (arrival at time t lost between t and ti ))dt (8)
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where ti is the time of the i th backup and t0 is the time when the backup policy was initialized. Note that the number
of backups, n, will also form part of the backup policy. Also note that if file loss during backup is important and can
not be incorporated in the second term of this equation, then one would rather use Eq. (6) to form an equation similar
to (8), only with one extra term.
This rather complicated formula might be rather difficult to optimize in general. The cost function of the policy
is on a very general form. In addition the formula demands the expectation of the interplay between file arrivals at a
given time and file loss at a time interval following that. Making such an expectation from sample data might be near
to impossible.
Thus we will in the next section take a look at minimizing risk for a given set of extra assumptions, such that
sample data can likely be used to form the necessary expectations.
6. Model 1: Finding a backup policy for a specific, ideal, risk function
6.1. The risk function for backup strategies
In this section we will take a look at using the risk function in a toy model where we can find an exact expression
for the update time, given the expected number of file changes over time. We want to do a full analysis of the problem
of finding an optimal strategy, that is one wants both the optimal number of backups and the optimal time of each
backup over a given time interval. Given a large time interval one would thus gain both the overall backup frequency
and the frequency for specific parts of the interval. A couple of assumptions will be specified, which are more or less
realistic. Thus this might best be seen as an example rather than a continuation of the previous section.
The time interval for which one wants to make a backup strategy can be specified by the start time, t0, and the end
time t0 + T . The first thing we need to do when describing a strategy is to find the optimal number of backups that
ought to be done in the time interval, n. This is the discrete part of the strategy specification. For n backups we can
choose freely when to do each backup. We will denote the backup times with t1, t2, . . . , tn = t0 + T , where ti−1 < ti
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We will also need the time between one backup and the next: 1ti = ti − ti−1. We have here assumed
that the run time of each backup is small in terms of the time between backups. Thus we have ignored the last term in
Eq. (6) and used (7) to form a risk function of the form found in Eq. (8).
When handling the cost component of the risk function, the easiest assumption one can make is that the cost
of backup increases linearly with the number of backups done. This assumption can be disputed, since if one does
incremental backup, one needs more capacity if it has been a long time since last backup than if another backup has
been recently done. However the time spent by an administrator on doing backups need not increase with the backup
size and might easily dominate the backup cost. This complication will thus be disregarded in this section. Under such
assumptions, the backup policy is fully specified by the number of updates n and the backup times t1, . . . , tn .
There is also a fixed price for being able to do backup, such as the infrastructure to do the backup. This one time
investment is assumed done already, since we do not want to discuss whether backups should be done at all, here, but
rather how often and when. Thus we can say that the cost is proportional to the number of backups done in a given
time interval. The cost component of the risk function thus comes in the form of
C(n, t0, t1, . . . , tn) = Cn. (9)
Here C is equal to the loss of file production due to an extra backup plus the money needed to do an to an extra
backup translated into file loss. Any increasing function of n might do the trick to represent the cost of doing backups,
but we hope this simple form of the cost of doing backups proves sufficient for our purposes. The total risk function
describing the expected loss over a time interval thus becomes
R(n, t0, t1, . . . , tn) = E(file loss)+ Cn (10)
where n is the number of backups in the time interval (t0, tn) = (t0 + T ) and t1, . . . , tn is the time of each backup.
6.2. A more detailed look at the maintenance risk function
The maintenance component of the risk function might be decomposed into the expected loss between each
backup, see (8). We will here assume that the actual file updating intensity, Q(t) is independent of the event of
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losing a file update later on, given the expected updating intensity, q(t). Thus both the file loss event and Q(t) can be
modeled using the expected updating intensity, but all stochastic activity in the two variables are in all other respects
independent. When the chance of loosing a file is proportional to the time to next backup, such as when using Mean
Time To Repair [24,25], this is an implicit assumption. In this section, we will assume that the probability of time loss
in t0 to t1 is proportional to N (t0, t1).
In such a setting, the conditional independence might be less appropriate: it might be more natural to consider file
loss arising from actual file updating activity, rather than expected file update activity. We will not try to handle that
problem here, but simply assume that such an approach makes sense in some circumstances, say where file loss is not
directly caused by file activity but rather by some process having to do with user activity which can be estimated by
the expected file activity.
Note also that a probability can not be proportional to a real number in general, as probability has an upper bound.
We will here further assume that the proportionality constant is so small that the probability for file loss in a given
backup cycle never is larger than say 10% for any realistic file activity. This approximation should not be any great
assumption, as in most realistic cases, the probability of file loss should be less than 10%.
Using conditional independence we get





q(t)E(I (file loss in t to ti ))dt. (11)
Since the expectation of an indicator is a probability and since we can decompose the event of file loss in [t, ti ]
to an interval over file loss for an infinitesimal time interval, which we assumed was proportional to q(t) with a
proportionality constant we can call γ , we get















= Cn + γ
n∑
i=1





q(t)η(ti−1, t)dt . (12)
Here the proportionality constant γ can be estimated by looking at the historic need for file backups versus the
square file activity at the same time. A simple linear regression between file backup need per file and square file
activity can yield such an estimate.
If we can assume that the last factor in Eq. (12) either is negligible or if
∫ ti
ti−1 q(t)η(ti−1, t)dt is proportional to
η(ti−1, ti )2, then the expression can be further simplified. The proportionality above is open to some question, but for
q(t) constant over a fixed time and zero otherwise, it can be seen to be true with a proportionality constant of 1/2. For
situations close to that, the assumption can be expected to be approximately correct. Thus we get
R(n, t1, . . . , tn) = Cn + γ
n∑
i=1
η(ti−1, ti )2 (13)
where we have absorbed the above mentioned proportionality assumption into the constant γ .
Thus we have four assumptions working here:
(1) Conditional independence between Q(T ) and the event of file loss given q(t).
(2) Cost(policy) ∝ n.
(3) P(file loss at time t) ∝ q(t).
(4)
∫ ti
ti−1 q(t)η(ti−1, t)dt ∝ η(ti−1, ti )2 or
∫ ti
ti−1 q(t)η(ti−1, t)dt << η(ti−1, ti )
2.
In order to work with this expression we also need a sensible cost for doing backup in terms of lost files C . When
γ and C have been estimated we can find the optimal backup strategy for this, admitting, rather simple minded model.
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6.3. Optimizing strategy
The task of finding the minimal risk can be split in two. For a given number of updates, n, one can find the optimal
times to do backup: (t1, . . . , tn−1, tn = t0 + T ). Given these backup times the risk for a given n is set. The second




N(ti−1,ti ) = N(t0,t0+T ) ⇒
n∑
i=1
η(ti−1, ti ) = η(t0, t0 + T ). (14)
Since η(·, ·) is assumed known for all input arguments, and since the start and end time is assumed known, then so
is η(t0, t0 + T ) ≡ Nt .
Before going to the risk function, it might be wise to recall that the time of backups can also be written using the
time between backups, 1ti = ti − ti−1, so that a given ti can be written as ti = t0 + 1t1 + 1t2 + · · · + 1ti .
Using that t0 is fixed, so that the dependency of t0 can be assumed known, we can write η(t0, ti ) = η(ti ) =
η(t0+1t1+1t2+· · ·+1ti ), where η having two parameters is the expected number of updates between two times and
η having one parameter is the expected number of updates from t0 to the given time. Thus the expected number of files
updated between two backups becomes η(ti−1, ti ) = η(t0+1t1+1t2+· · ·+1ti )−η(t0+1t1+1t2+· · ·+1ti−1).
Note that since 1t1 +1t2 + · · · +1tn = T , we do not need to specify the last time between backups, 1tn .
Putting this parametrization into Eq. (13), one gets
R(n,1t1, . . . ,1tn−1) = Cn + 2γ
n−1∑
i=1
[η(1t1 + . . . 1ti )2 − η(1t1 + . . . 1ti )η(1t1 + . . . 1ti−1)]
− 2γ Ntη(1t1 + . . . 1tn−1)+ γ N 2t . (15)
One can now find the derivative of the risk function for a given time between updates 1ti for a fixed i < n:
1
2γ
∂R(n,1t1, . . . ,1tn−1)
∂1ti
= −η(1t1 + . . . 1ti−1)η′(1t1 + . . . 1ti )+ 2η(1t1 + . . . 1ti )η′(1t1 + . . . 1ti )
− η′(1t1 + . . . 1ti )η(1t1 + . . . 1ti+1)− η(1t1 + . . . 1ti )η′(1t1 + . . . 1ti+1)
+ 2η(1t1 + . . . 1ti+1)η′(1t1 + . . . 1ti+1)− η′(1t1 + . . . 1ti+1)η
×(1t1 + . . . 1ti+2)− η(1t1 + . . . 1ti+1)η′(1t1 + . . . 1ti+2)+ · · · Ntη′
×(1t1 + . . . 1tn−1) = (−η(1t1 + . . . 1ti−1)+ 2η(1t1 + . . . 1ti )− η
×(1t1 + . . . 1ti+1))η′(1t1 + . . . 1ti )+ 12γ
∂R(n, t1, . . . , tn)
∂1ti+1
. (16)
Since both partial derivatives should be zero for the policy that gives minimal risk, then so should the difference
between two subsequent derivatives. There will remain three terms:
−η(1t1 + . . . 1ti−1)+ 2η(1t1 + . . . 1ti )− η(1t1 + . . . 1ti+1) = 0. (17)
Setting ai ≡ η(1t1 + . . . 1ti ) one thus gets the difference equation
−ai−1 + 2ai − ai+1 = 0. (18)
In order to solve this homogeneous difference equation, one can find the characteristic polynomial, see [34]. In this
case, this is f (x) = (1 − z)2. The solution to such an equation is a j = b + cj . Setting a0 = η(0) = 0 and an = Nt
yields a j = j NT /n, so that
η(ti−1, ti ) = Ntn . (19)
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The time of backups should thus be chosen so that the expected number of updates is equal in each time interval
between backups. The policy rule found here is easy to interpret, and can be communicated to administrators with
no mathematical training. We have verified, informally, that this scheme in fact agrees with the practices used by a
number of system administrators.
The assumptions here were formulated so that an easy interpretation was likely. The result is valid for these
assumptions, so the question becomes whether the assumptions are correct. The assumption of the probability of file
loss being proportional to the file activity over a backup cycle is the assumption that might most easily be criticized
in practical cases.
The result summed up in Eq. (19) does not depend on the parameters C or γ . Thus if the total backup intensity, n,
is fixed in a large time period, [t0, t0 + T ], then no estimation of such parameters is necessary. It is only for the sake
of finding the backup intensity that these two parameters are needed.
Putting the solution for optimal backup times into Eq. (13), one gets





where n now is the only part of the policy left to be determined. This function is convex for n > 0. This means that the







Thus the number of updates needed is proportional to the expected number of file updates in the time interval
(t0, t0 + T ). It increases with increasing probabilities for the need for backup of each file, γ , and decreases with
increasing cost of doing each backup, C .
This suggests that a strategy of copy-on-write is the optimal one, or alternatively a coarse-grained approximation
to this.
6.4. Two examples
It is worth stressing that while the number of assumptions and the mathematical path for deriving the strategy in
Model 1 is cumbersome, the strategy itself is easy to use. The following two examples will hopefully illustrate that
point.
For our first example, assume that experience shows that on Mondays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Fridays, the
file activity can be classified as normal. On Thursdays the file activity is twice the normal level, while on weekends
it is half the normal level. It has been determined that the update frequency during normal load should be equal
to one backup per day. Thus the total backup frequency must have already been established. Then the principle of
having equal expected file activity between backups established in Eq. (19) says that there should be two backups on
Thursdays, none on Saturdays and one on Sundays.
The example here is cyclic with period one week. Thus it does not matter if we want a policy for the next year or
for the next week as the policy for the next year will simply be a repeated process of the policy for a week. Note also
that the principle of equal expected file activity does not determine when in the cycle one should start doing backups.
As long as the expected file activity is equal between backups, the models does not distinguish between two different
policies. Thus here, doing backups at midnight, plus midday for Thursday is neither better nor worse than doing the
backups at 6 in the morning, plus six in the afternoon for Thursdays. If a model that differentiates between two such
policies is wanted, then a policy built on other assumptions is needed, see for instance Section 7.
For the second example, the backup intensity is also to be determined for the next ten weeks. Each backup costs
$100 in this case study and the loss of a file is estimated to cost $0.5, thus C = 200. No large scale change of file
activity is expected. The largest time interval where one have different expectations for different times of in the interval
is one week in this example. Thus expectations are cyclic with a period of one week, such as in the first example. The
expected file activity during different parts of the week is also the same as before.
For example, local data show that the expected number of files updated in a week is Nt = 10 000. Experience also
shows that about 15 file updates are lost each Thursdays, the day with the highest activity, when no backup is done
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during that day. Thus γ = 15/10 000 ∗ 2/7 = 0.00043. Then the optimal number of updates per week is n = 14.64.
Having a fixed number of times to do backup per week makes this part of the administration more easy. It would also
be nice to do the backups at the same time of the day for days with normal load. Thus n = 14 is better than n = 15.
The policy then becomes two backups during normal load, four on Thursdays and one each for Saturday and Sunday.
7. Model 2: The windshield-wiper or snow-clearing model
7.1. Introduction
We turn next to a more realistic model, which is also more specialized. It will here be assumed that the backup
intensity has already been determined, and that the expected number of updates is periodic. Instead of the chance of
file update-loss being proportional to the change activity in the period, we will instead use the Maintenance Theorem
and assume that the chance or risk of file update-loss is proportional to the time to the next backup. Note that also here,
such a proportionality can only be an approximation for low loss probability, since if not, we could get probabilities
above 1. We will not assume that the backup time is so small that loss within the backup operation can be neglected.
The resulting strategy will tell us when to do backup inside each repeated period (typically one day). As mentioned
previously, Model 1 could not differentiate between to strategies with equal backup intensity when the file arrivals
were periodic. As long as the expected number of updates are the same, the risk is the same for the loss function used
there. Here we will find that the time of backup is important, and a few examples will show how the optimal backup
time can be found. It should however be noted that the approach used here requires more mathematics in daily use,
as well as being more restricted in the assumption of period file arrivals and fixed backup intensity equal to the time
interval of the period.
7.2. Motivation
The process of periodic maintenance, counteracting a random arrival process, makes one think of the process of
clearing raindrops from a car windshield, or snow from the roads. Random arrivals can occur anywhere on the system
(i.e. the windshield) but we must sweep the system in a sequential manner. The rain drops do not stop while we are
wiping, so there is always rain to be cleared. What then is the best strategy?
Unlike rain, which can run directly down a drain (like copy on write), snow builds up and requires a special clearing
effort, just like a disk that accumulates change. First instinct is to wait for the snow to stop and then clear it, but what
if the snow does not stop? Alternatively, suppose that the snow falls only during the night; if we wait until the snow
stops, then the amount of time the roads are clear for traffic is reduced because we use up that valuable time on clearing
the snow. Perhaps it would be better to start clearing the snow while it is still snowing, so that we are finished just as
the snow stops? How can we find out the optimal strategy?
Once again, there are two issues: when and where the snow falls. Sweeping is a space–time process, while the
arrival is generally evenly spread. We do not have any data at the level of disk sectors to gauge how evenly spread
change is across the sectors of disks during normal usage: this is an empirical study that remains for the future.
However, we can still make an estimate.
If we assume a maximum entropy arrival process in space (the location of changes on a disk) so that changes are
evenly spread (like snow) and continuous scanning with respect to the system locations, like a windshield-wiper or
snow plough, then there are always just as many new arrivals in front of the windshield-wiper as there are behind
it. There is no advantage to starting at any particular place. Simply scanning from end to end of the system with a
clearing process is enough.
However, scheduling in time is important. If we set the clearing process on ‘intermittent wipe’, while the rain or
snow falls constantly, then there might be more outstanding raindrops in front of the wiper blade than behind it in
a single sweep. The discrepancy will be proportional to probability of arrivals during the time elapsed between the
backups.
Consider the diagram in Fig. 5. We consider a single daily period of the arrival process q(t) and it will be understood
that this pattern is repeated over many similar occurrences. The expected number of arrivals as a function of time, q(t),
is measured in change quanta (sectors etc), so that all changes are of the same size, and that a backup is centered on
some time t0 during the period. Our aim is to minimize the risk as a function of t0, i.e. determine the optimal time for
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Fig. 5. The windshield-wiper model scans across files in a time tb , such that the average time that a file has to wait for backup is EQ t . There are
three regions of currently unknown sizes: region I before backup, region II during backup and region III after backup. The file change process q(t)
brings q arrivals at time t and provides a probabilistic weight to the expected risk: if more files are arriving, the risk of loss will be higher.
starting the backup t0 − 12 tb. Note that the risk of loss is entirely placed at the source of the changes; if we want to
imagine that parts of the maintenance process are also capable of introducing risk of loss this must be handled with
an expanded model. We shall omit this complication for the present paper [35].
7.3. Risk functions
Let us define the time it takes for a backup to complete to be tb so that, if changes can be copied at a rate r(t0) at






where P is the time interval of the period. Note that we are allowing for the fact that the system’s ability to copy
changes or to repair itself might be altered by a heavy load. In other words, the maintenance process might itself
inflict a heavy load on the system.
Because we have periodicity and one backup per period, we do not have to study several backups such as is done
in Eq. (7) but study the single backup case of Eq. (6) instead. Also, we might drop the backup cost term, since the
backup intensity has already been established. The assumption here is that the probability of file loss is independent
of the actual (Q(t)) or expected (q(t)) arrival intensity, but is rather a linear function of the time between arrival
and the backup of that specific arrival. This can not be the case for arbitrary large times between arrival and backup,
but we use it here under the assumption that the change of file loss is low for any specific realistic file arrival. Thus
E(Q(t)I (arrival at time t lost between t and t1) = q(t)twait(t) and we get the following risk function:




We would like to minimize this risk, given that a single scan of the backup will be performed, centered on time t0.
To evaluate this risk, we split up the daily period into three regions: before the backup, during the backup and after
the backup (see Fig. 5). Note that if we should be painstakingly precise, the actual time spent on backup will depend
on the actual file arrival rate Q(t) and that it thus would be quite difficult to separate the regions. In order to make the
model tractable, we assume that the regions can be separated according to the expected time used on backup, tb(t0).
For simplicity we shall assume, initially, that the backup rate is constant to avoid unnecessary complication. In a
regular backup or maintenance scenario, this need not be far from the truth. The twait function is now defined piecewise
over the three regions:
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• The average time to the next backup, in region I, is simply the distance between now and the average backup
time t0 (we do not know exactly when the backup of a specific object will be made within the region II), i.e.
twait−I = (t0 − t).
• In region II, half of the files that arrive will be backed up during the backup while another half will have missed
the boat and will have to wait a full period P to be picked up. The average time to backup is thus the average of P
and the same as region I, i.e. twait−II = 12 P + t0 − t .• In region III, all of the files have to wait until the next backup, and apart from the extra distance, they satisfy the
same average expression as in region I, i.e. twait−III = (P + t0 − t).
One can discuss the precise formulation of these expressions, but the result turns out to be not strongly dependent on
the details. The crucial factors to risk are the competition between the arrivals q(t) and the linear, periodic distance
function. Thus we have
R(t0, tb) = R0
∫ t0− 12 tb
0
q(t)(t0 − t)dt + R0































Introducing previously used notation of η(t) which is the accumulated arrivals from time 0, we can express this as






























and η′′(t0) = q ′(t0) < 0. For a given estimate for the expected arrival intensity, the accumulated intensity can be made
through a simple integration or numerical summation. If one has an analytic expression for η(t) then in some cases
one can solve Eq. (26) analytically. If not, the equation can be solved through numerical methods such as Newton’s
method or by analyzing a plot of Eq. (25).
If one can assume tb  t0 one can simplify Eq. (26) to
q(t0) = η′(t0) = η(P)P . (27)
This can be solved graphically by plotting η(t) versus a line connecting (0, 0) with P, η(P) and finding the points
where η(t) is parallel to the line and curves downward, see Fig. 6.
7.4. Example 1: A simple arrival function
We must now specify the expected arrivals distribution over the period. This can be measured, as in Fig. 2, or we





















This trial function is crude but exhibits the main features of the actual measurements over a single cycle. Since
we treat only a single cycle, it is assumed that the distribution is itself an expectation value of behavior over many
cycles, but again we need not concern ourselves with anything but the qualitative features here, since the conclusions
are fairly robust.
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Fig. 6. A plot of an accumulated arrival function (that used in example 1) along with the graphical solution to the optimal strategy for t0.
Fig. 7. A plot of the approximate arrivals function. Axis gradations are measured in dimensionless units of P .
The function R(t0, tb) is a function of the mid-point of the backup and its length, in this parameterization, but we
control only t0 − 12 tb in practice, or t0 implicitly. We can plot the function as a surface (see Fig. 8).
The result shows a very robust conclusion: namely that, for backups that take a relatively short time compared to
the cycle time (which is the usual case—perhaps a few hours out of the day), the time of least risk occurs when one
centers the backup around t0 = P/2, i.e. at the time of changeover from maximum to minimum of activity of the
system (compare to Figs. 6 and 7). This can easily be seen from Eq. (27), which yields sin(2pi t0/P) = 0 with sin
going from positive to negative (negative curvature for η(t0). Thus t0 = 12 P . Note that if the more general expression
q(t) = A + B sin(2pi(x − φ)/P) was used, this would only serve to adjust t0 to 12 P + φ. Note also that since
q( 12 P −1t)− 1 = −(q( 12 P +1t)− 1), the result t0 = 12 P will hold even when tb > 0, see Eq. (26), as long as the
solution is not transformed from a minimum of the risk to a maximum, see Fig. 8.
It is a fortunate coincidence that this happens also to be the time at which the system generally begins to have most
resources to give to the problem, but the conclusion does not depend on this fact. We have not used the backup rate
r(t0) explicitly here. Choosing tb to be small simply means that there are sufficient resources to copy the changed data
in a short interval of time.
Consider an example of this. Suppose we have a backup that takes two hours to complete, and we know that the
maximum activity occurs at 12:00 noon each day. Then the minimal risk occurs if we start the backup at around
t0 − 12 tb = 18:00− 12 × 2, i.e. at 17:00 hours.
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Fig. 8. A surface plot of the risk function as a function of t0 and
1
2 tb axis gradations are measured in dimensionless units of P . For small tb , it has
a clear minimum at t0 = P/2. Note that this is not the time of minimum activity.
Fig. 9. A plot of a more realistic but still approximate arrivals function. Axis gradations are measured in dimensionless units of P .
As we increase the size duration of the backup tb → P , the conclusion becomes unstable at about tb ∼ P/4. In
other words, if a backup takes more than about a quarter of a day to complete (six hours), then there is no particular
advantage to starting the backup at any time, assuming that copying resources are constant and available. As we
approach a full day tb → P (continuous and very slow windshield-wipe operation, as opposed to a fast intermittent
wipe), it even seems advantageous to start closer to the start of the active region, at around 6:00 a.m. in the extreme
case. This is because one has as good a chance of picking up changes as they occur as one has by waiting until after
they have already happened.
7.5. Example 2: A more realistic q(t)
The simple sinusoidal function is not a good representation of a real system. The actual arrivals function in Fig. 2











(1+ sin(2pi t)) e−pi(t−1/4). (29)
The advantage of this form is that it resembles the true function and that it is still simple enough to subject to analysis.
On the time-scale of the figure the arrivals function approximates the measured values in Fig. 2. 0 and 1 correspond
to 06:00 hours, 0.25 corresponds to 12:00, 0.5 is 18:00 hours and 0.75 is 00:00 or 24:00.
We repeat the same analysis with this new function and obtain the risk surface shown in Fig. 10. As one might
expect the qualitative features are the same as in the simple test function, but the optimal low risk point has moved
slightly closer to the peak of the arrivals function.
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Fig. 10. A plot of the risk surface. Axis gradations are measured in dimensionless units of P .
Using computer algebra and numerics, we find a minimum for small tb to be at about 0.32P , which is in the
afternoon just before 14:00 hours. As the length of tb increases, the minimum risk point moves almost linearly toward
midnight. When tb = 0.3, i.e. sequential backup takes as much as six hours, then the optimal time t0 moves to about
20:00− 6:00/2 = 17:00 hours.
The introduction of this asymmetry reveals the reason for the result of the simple test function in Section 7.3. The
result of P/2 there is a balance between the risk of getting too far away from the peak of activity and being too close
to no arrivals.
8. Some comments on software
There are several programs in common use that represent different approaches top file copying. It is interesting to
relate these to the analyses presented here.
The well-known programs rdump, ufsdump and tar use a file system based approach to scanning files. These
programs label files distinguishably but treat them as closed quanta; i.e. if a file is marked as changed the entire file
is copied as a virtual unit. These programs are CPU intensive but fast and furious at copying, but contain little in the
way of risk countermeasures. Cfengine treats files in the same way but, due to its security checks and insistence on
host autonomy, scans file systems quite inefficiently and therefore tends to copy with low CPU load over long times.
Using cfengine to take backup copies therefore results in relatively large tb.
The program rsync [36] is a curiosity in this regard. It scans file systems and treats files as virtual units, but once a
change is discovered, it changes strategy and attempts to optimize the copy into byte differences. Since the underlying
disk structure is in sectors, this will result in an unknown number of sector writes. The efficiency of rsync in terms
of sector operations would make an interesting study in its own right.
dd copies raw device blocks (which are whole numbers of fundamental sectors). It therefore satisfies the model
of indistinguishable entity copying, somewhat like a copy on write, but without random access. The dd limitation is
that it copies as a stream so that the ordering of data changes as the device blocks are allocated. The result has no
consistent structure, but satisfies our model as long as one adjusts for the changing locations of data in the stream.
Another way of saying this is that it does not work convergently in the sense of Ref. [37].
Many of the programs mentioned here are biased by the expectation of writing to tape, i.e. serial non-random
access medium. This makes it hard to model their actual behavior in a given situation without a knowledge of the
environment in which they operate. For that reason, we do not attempt to go beyond this kind of analysis in this paper
(which is long enough already). Some of the results here are therefore only fully realized in copy-on-write duplication.
There are clearly advantages to a file based backup if the purpose of backup is to archive versions. One needs to be
able to distinguish sectors in order to retrieve from a backup copy without doing a complete restore.
9. Conclusions
We have examined the process of making a backup copy of data for either archiving or for redundancy. We examine
the backup problem as a study of the risk of loss and use the maintenance paradigm to discuss this. We assume that
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the risk of loss occurs entirely at the data sources, i.e. that the backup process is itself reliable. To take into account
unreliability in the backup procedure in non-trivial situations, some graph theoretical modifications to the present
arguments are required.
On the basis of empirical data we have developed methods that determine the optimum time for a backup to be taken
so as to minimize the risk of loss by a sudden catastrophe. For a user activity profile that peaks around midday, we
find that middle to late afternoon is the optimum solution. This result should be recomputed in different environments.
We allow for the possibility that some data might be prioritized over others, or that different levels of consistency
can be introduced by decisions about multiplicity of backup copies.
We emphasize that there are other aspects of backup strategy that we have not been able to take into account
within the space of this paper. These include the choice of copying speed as well as considering multiple risk models
that have potentially conflicting interests. Our model of constant copy rate depends on there being sufficient system
headroom to make backup a bearable load on the system. On critically loaded systems, this is invalidated and the
problem becomes considerably harder to solve. Hopefully few systems ever get into such difficulty. We hope to return
to these matters in future work.
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